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“It’s not tolerance I’m asking for, it’s respect!” A conceptual framework to differentiate between tolerance, acceptance and (two types of) respect

“Es geht mir nicht um Toleranz, es geht mir um Respekt!”

**Ein konzeptioneller Rahmen zur Unterscheidung zwischen Toleranz, Akzeptanz und
(zwei Arten von) Respekt**

Abstract

Due to a rising interest in empirical ‘respect’ research but at the same time a somewhat fuzzy use of the term and its semantically close neighbors, we introduce a conceptual framework. The framework draws on existing philosophical traditions and empirical psychological works alike. It is pointed out that respect, acceptance, and tolerance are all attitudes of a subject towards an object which are not aligned on one dimension, but are concerned with quite different issues. Moreover, we propose that research needs to differentiate between two very different kinds of respect. Whereas appraisal respect, acceptance, and tolerance are attitudinal reflections of a subject’s decisions on certain issues (i.e., on influence, membership, and presence), recognition respect is proposed to be an overarching processing mode, i.e., a general attitude on how to confront others.

Zusammenfassung:

Da das generelle Interesse an empirischer „Respekt“-Forschung zunimmt, zur gleichen Zeit jedoch der Begriff und seine semantischen Nachbarn recht unscharf gebraucht werden, stellen wir in diesem Beitrag einen konzeptionellen Rahmen zur Differenzierung vor. Dieser bedient sich existierender philosophischer Ansätze wie auch der empirisch arbeitenden Psychologie. Es wird herausgestellt, dass Respekt, Akzeptanz und Toleranz objektbezogene Einstellungen eines Subjektes sind, welche sich jedoch nicht auf einer Dimension anordnen lassen. Auch wird vorgeschlagen, dass die Forschung zumindest zwischen zwei Arten des Respekts differenzieren sollte. Während bewertender Respekt (engl. appraisal respect), Akzeptanz und Toleranz die Entscheidung eines Subjektes über Fragen, die das Objekt betreffen (Einfluss, Mitgliedschaft und Präsenz), widerspiegeln, handelt es sich bei anerkennendem Respekt (engl. recognition respect) um einen übergreifenden Prozessmodus, d.h., eine generelle Einstellung wie ein Subjekt Objekten begegnet.

“It’s not tolerance I am asking for, it’s respect!” This was a statement by a son of immigrants in Germany whom we interviewed when we started our research endeavours in the field of respect. He saw a fundamental difference in the two terms ‘respect’ and ‘tolerance’. As our conversation proceeded, we came to think that, indeed, all too often people use respect, acceptance, and tolerance interchangeably, sometimes using tolerance when respect would have been more adequate (cf. UNESCO, 1995) and sometimes speak of respect even though people only express tolerance or mere acceptance.

While people may employ one or the other terminology because it is ‘fashionable’ to use it, those who are affected by the outcomes are naturally more sensible towards the different (core) implications of tolerance, acceptance, and respect. This may be looked upon as mere incidents of misunderstanding, but today, as more and more empirical (psychological) research revolves around these terms, scientists face a similar problem

when looking at each others works. It becomes evident that the intuitively chosen labels, specifically in the field of respect research, seemingly mean the same, but the measurements or manipulation designs of the studies all too often diverge and do not capture or evoke the same kinds of phenomena. Consequently, current studies on the subject of respect are hard to put into perspective. Thus, it is time to integrate some of the results into a more coherent conceptual framework.

Following Kruglanski's (2001) advice, we decided to develop a framework for the above phenomena that follows a compelling "aesthetic beauty" rather than fitting a model to data. It is a framework which can guide understanding of existing and coming research works. Naturally, a framework's strengths, i.e., its preciseness and distinct categories, are also its weaknesses. The here presented sorting of existing research into our framework might seem too rigid or even wrong to some people who would like to stress other aspects of the very same research. However, we are confident that the framework can, if seen as 'only a first' framework, be valuable for researchers to connect their works to others and at the same time spot new potential research questions within a bigger context. It is an attempt to overcome the momentary state of confusion which significantly hinders progress in understanding the respect phenomenon.

What kind of phenomena are we talking about

To begin with, respect, acceptance, and tolerance all show themselves between a subject and an object. The subject is usually a person, someone who pays it to, feels it about, shows it for something or someone. While one could also accumulate persons and look at them on an inter-group or macro-system level, we will for the remainder of this paper solely focus upon respect, acceptance and tolerance as shown by people for people.

Linking these sort of 'relational phenomena' to a more general field of research, we propose to refer to tolerance, acceptance and respect as 'attitudes' because similar to the definition of attitudes they can be looked upon as "unidimensional summary statements" (Thompson, Kray, & Lind, 1998, p. 362) usually with "a psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree of favour or disfavour" (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, p. 1). This perspective also seems to be shared by philosophers (see Dillon, in this issue).

Additionally, we propose that it is necessary to divide these attitudes further into those that are reflections of a subject's decisions on concrete issues concerning the object and those that are concerned with the decision process itself. Whereas we consider acceptance, tolerance and one kind of respect (i.e., appraisal respect) as issue driven attitudes (for which the object needs to fulfil certain conditions in order to be responded to favourably), we propose that another specific type of respect (i.e., recognition respect) should be seen as an attitude that is mainly concerned about the process, i.e., independent of an object's concrete features (it is unconditional, cf. Lalljee, Laham, & Tam, in press).

Recognition respect: The way one 'looks' at others

While Respect is certainly a multifaceted terminology (see Dillon, in this issue; Hill, 1998), the most prominent understanding of it is the one described in the Practical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant as 'Achtung' (1988). The central principle of Kant's ethic is the so called Categorical Imperative. In one of its formulations it says: "Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always also as an end in itself". Please note that it says "...but always *also*..." which indicates that this sort of respect does not have to be entirely free of instrumental reasons if the object is also treated as an end in itself.

Yet, what does this end in itself mean? Looking upon the translation of the term, we find that respect derives from the Latin root 'respicere' – translated as 'to look again' or 'to look back at'. In that sense, we may argue that respecting somebody the 'Kantian way' entails giving them a consideration above the first glance. Darwall (1977) thus specifies this kind of respect as 'recognition respect' and states: "To have recognition respect for persons is to give proper weight to the fact that they are persons" (p. 39). Simon (in press) stresses that it is about perceiving and responding to someone else as an equal. It can thus be argued that it is this kind of respect that is meant when people speak of mutual respect (cf. Dreikurs Ferguson & Page, 2003) as mutuality implies a certain equality.

We find that researchers tap into this kind of respect by manipulating how much participants and their inputs into group-work are recognized and thoroughly considered by an experimenter or the rest of the group (De Cremer, 2002; Simon & Stürmer, 2003, 2005). That respect is about being 'properly seen and considered' is also corroborated by justice researchers who argue that 'to feel respected' is a central ingredient of people's fairness perceptions (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler, DeGoey, & Smith, 1996; Tyler & Lind, 1992). On the other side, not being treated or recognized as equal is considered unjust and disrespectful (Miller, 2001). Note however, that equal or fair treatment does not necessarily entail a distributive justice (Schmidtz, 2006), i.e., that everybody in a group of five is getting two dollars if ten dollars are to be split. Justice research has shown that people rather consider something as (equally) fair when procedural justice concerns are met (Lind & Tyler, 1988), i.e., that each of the five people has a chance to raise their opinion on how the money should be divided (e.g., based upon performance or need). The sociologist Sennett (2003) draws upon this aspect when explicating his view on "respect in a world of inequality". It becomes evident that it is not the outcome of a decision that is considered fair or respectful but rather the 'how' of the decision making process – including that people's voice and dignity is considered in and after the process (cf. Margalit, 1998).

In that sense, a subject is respecting an object when an issue has to be settled between the two and the subject decides to confront the object with arguments in a 'sincere' way, i.e., recognizing the object as an autonomous equal (human being) with the same right to decide on issues concerning his/her life. Part of being respectful thus entails that a subject cannot determine the criteria by which to settle the issue alone. To pay proper heed to an object also means to fully acknowledge its opinion on the criteria by which to decide upon the legitimacy of an issue. Thus, if a subject disagrees with an object on the criteria, the subject cannot overrule the object and at the same time claim that it behaves respectfully towards the object.

For our framework, conclusively, we suggest that recognition respect is an attitude on the process rather than a reflection of its results. Moreover, recognition respect is ‘categorical’. There is no such thing as recognizing someone as an equal human being only to a certain degree. It is either full recognition respect or its counterpart: disrespect.

Reflections of Decision Results: Tolerance, Acceptance, and Appraisal Respect

Contrasted with recognition respect, we argue that tolerance, acceptance, and another kind of respect, (i.e., appraisal respect) are reflections of a subject’s final decision on issues concerning an object. More specifically, we propose that they are reflections of decisions which concern quite different issues linked to an object: (1) Tolerance is a possible attitudinal reaction to an object’s *presence* in the subject’s environment. (2) Acceptance is a possible attitudinal reaction to an object’s *membership* in the subject’s group. (3) Appraisal respect is a possible attitudinal reaction to an object’s *influence* on the subject. All of them are not unconditional, unlike recognition respect, as the underlying issues (presence, membership, and influence) are being decided based upon certain features of the object which are matched against specific criteria.

People often seem to be intrigued to think of the terms as lying on one dimension, one entailing somehow more than the other. For example, one may start off by saying “I tolerate you”, later, when one feels more secure with the other around, one may state “I accept you”, and finally, when one has come to esteem the other, one might say “I respect you”. Indeed, readers might notice here that the object moves in a way psychologically closer to the subject – or to the subject’s identity. It is therefore not surprising that one can usually tolerate more than one can respect. However, there might also be special situations which make it possible for someone to respect others, but not to tolerate them. To cite former French President Charles de Gaulle (1968) “I respect only those who resist me, but I cannot tolerate them.” Thus, though admittedly tempting, the following considerations for appraisal respect, acceptance and tolerance should not be analysed from the daily use and knowledge about the terms, but rather looked upon as reduced to the exclusive cores of each attitude (cf. Weinrich, 1989).

Tolerance: The question of who one wants to ‘see’

As mentioned above, we propose that tolerance is about an object’s presence in the subject’s environment. This is to say that tolerance as an attitude carries in its core a subject’s message on the legitimacy of an object’s presence in the subject’s aware field of perception.

From a historical point of view, the concept of tolerance is a result of the religious conflicts that arose in Europe during the 16th century (Beneker, 2006; Zagorin, 2003). Although the toleration of foreign cults in the Roman Empire might be the first example of tolerance, the religious wars in medieval Europe are more important for an analysis of the term ‘tolerance’. A decisive date is 1598, when Heinrich IV granted freedom of religion to the adherents of Calvinism, the Huguenots. Through it, religion became a

private matter and the state could preserve its unity. In the so called Edict of Nantes, Heinrich IV combined different kinds of edicts that had been enacted in the previous years and therewith guaranteed tolerance and freedom of conscience to the Huguenots. Because uniform (religious) structures disbanded, the resulting conflicts were seen to only be resolved through violence or the opposite of violence, the so called consensus, as a form of agreement in which the interests of each party are completely fulfilled. Compromise, as the third and most realistic option of conflict resolution, was only seen as an option when the disagreeing parties are forced by concrete circumstances to find a solution of which they can all approve even if it does not meet all of their genuine demands. Tolerance now is just that only that it means an 'asymmetrical kind of compromise'.


To say that someone is 'tolerable' implies that he/she deviates from a non-specified norm and this latent implication needs a justification. Tolerance judges a specific kind of behaviour in relation to a presupposed norm that is not a legal norm. That means it is not legitimated in the way legal norms are; which is the reason why the concept of tolerance was never a central term in the philosophy of right. Yet, nonetheless or maybe because of that, tolerance is regarded as essential for the maintenance of civil order – a fact taken up by Locke (1689) in his "letter concerning toleration". In this respect, it is interesting that the Latin 'tolerare' from 'tolus (the burden)' means both 'to bear, endure, suffer' but also 'to support, nourish'. The connection between these two meanings becomes more apparent from the above historical events. Bearing with, enduring, and suffering the pain or hardship associated with disagreement and dispute are in themselves ways to support and sustain society and peace. Thus, whereas tolerance is semantically loosely linked to freedom or liberty, a more precise definition of tolerance is that "[it] is the deliberate decision to refrain from prohibiting, hindering or otherwise coercively interfering with conduct of which one disapproves, although one has the power to do so" (Horton, 1998). This, however, is the reason why the term itself sparks some scepticism. As Derrida (2001, p.126) points out "I prefer demonstrations of tolerance above those of intolerance, yet, I hesitate using the word 'tolerance' and the discourse it organizes. It is a discourse based on religious roots, which rests by the powerful, and is always linked with dismissive concessions." [translated by the first author of this paper from the German version].

From a more abstract point of view, tolerance has one central underlying issue: an object's presence in the subject's system. A subject becomes aware of an object which deviates from the subject's norm and which does not avoid the issue, but 'claims' a presence in the subject's system. Once aware to the subject, this claim cannot be avoided but only by sheer ignorance (also referred to as 'passive tolerance' or 'retreatism' in the Strain Theory of Merton, 1968). If the subject decides to confront the issue, we believe that individuals may confront the presence of objects in different ways, either respectfully by looking at these objects thoroughly and considering their right and criteria to claim presence (such as one would do when confronting someone as an equal human being), or disrespectfully by merely giving them a superficial glance (as introduced in our section on recognition respect). It is only afterwards that a subject decides upon the legitimacy of the issue.

Thus there are four possibilities: being respectfully intolerant but also being disrespectfully tolerant, as well as being disrespectfully intolerant or respectfully tolerant. Additionally, we would propose that treating someone respectfully also entails the

chance of not being able to reach a conclusion; instead a subject may find itself in a dilemma because it cannot agree with the object upon the same criteria by which to decide upon the issue of presence. In this case, because the subject recognizes the equal rights of the object, the subject has to re-enter the process. If taken together, we can construct a process model of tolerance as depicted in Figure 1.

Figure 1: A process model of disrespectful and respectful tolerance



For illustrational purposes, let us draw upon two children to explain the rationale. Let us consider one child. We will call this child Carl. Now, let us also imagine that another child, named Lisa, appears on ‘his’ playground. Even more so, she occupies his favourite swing, yet only seems to sit on it rather than swing. Carl has different options in that situation. He may, for example, decide that Lisa is a girl and thus by no means equal to the standards that boys usually fulfil in his eyes. He might even think that girls are inferior and that girls do not have the courage to make proper use of a swing which is why he decides to push her off the swing. We would call such an attitude not only intolerance but disrespectful intolerance. In another scenario, his parents might have told him

to be friends with girls. Although he still thinks that girls stink, he might then actually decide to at least tolerate her presence and wait until she is done with her swinging. This sort of attitude appears like tolerance at first, but it is actually a very disrespectful form of tolerance, again, because he does not regard Lisa as equal. If, however, Carl was brought up believing that everybody is equal, deserves the same chances, and has the same rights as he does, the situation might turn out differently. Under such circumstances, Carl should acknowledge Lisa as equal. Going up to the swing and talking to her, he might find out that she moved to the same neighbourhood and that this is her first time on a swing ever which is why she still looks so uneasy on it. Carl might decide then that he once started just the same as Lisa and thus lets her go on with her swinging (respectful tolerance). In yet another scenario, Carl might find out that Lisa is from a different neighbourhood. He tells her that he wants to use the swing because this is 'his' playground. Lisa agrees because she also hates it when other kids occupy the playground in her own neighbourhood and thus decides to hand the swing to Carl and leave the playground. Arguably, this is probably a very rare case, but it is a possibility. What might happen more often is that Carl recognizes Lisa as equal, but their criteria for deciding upon Lisa's presence are different. Carl might argue that playgrounds are for kids in the neighbourhood and Lisa might state that playgrounds are for all kids, no matter where they come from. Carl (being the subject in our model) is consequently in a dilemma because the issue cannot be resolved respectfully right there. He cannot reach an immediate conclusion and thus has to re-enter the process. However, when re-entering the process, Carl once again has the choice to just ignore the issue and not pursue it any further, i.e., by walking away. Or, because he anticipates that he will never be able to reach a conclusion together with Lisa, he might decide to throw his equality principles over board and just decide for himself how he wants to handle the issue of Lisa's presence on the playground (which would now represent the disrespectful path in our model in Figure 1).

Acceptance: The question of who one wants to have in one's group


Acceptance as a term is a little vaguer because it has, at least to our knowledge, never been explored by philosophers at any time. The word itself can be derived from the Latin 'accipere' which translates 'to embrace or adopting'. Closely related, we propose that the core issue of accepting people is their embracement as part of the subject's group (cf. Simon & Stürmer, 2005). As such it is different from toleration which only entails a presence in the subject's space of perception without any assignment of membership.

Moreover, while the threshold for awareness of an object's presence in a subject's system is usually relatively little (because the object often vitally depends upon it and thus forces the subject into the question of tolerance, for instance, to avoid violence), acceptance gives a subject more freedom because an issue of membership is generally not as urgent. Also, acceptance implies a bigger chance of not accepting because a subject does not have to fear as many consequences – as objects often have various degrees of freedoms when choosing groups. As such, acceptance is different from resignation, although often confused with it. Resignation entails that people might 'embrace' an object, but do not perceive a chance of doing differently.

Also, it has to be noted that the choice people express when using acceptance is an individual decision, as it is in the case of tolerance too, but it can only be made within the boundaries of the subject’s own group. Indeed, acceptance implies that the subject itself needs to have group membership before granting acceptance.

Note that we specifically consider a subject’s signalling of an object’s group membership as an issue of acceptance and not of respect (- although others imply that an object’s inclusion in a group may be a central part of the ‘respect message’, De Cremer, 2003; De Cremer & Tyler, 2005a). An object’s membership may be responded to respectfully or disrespectfully, but should, in our conception, be regarded independent of a subject’s recognition respect for the object. We can thus develop a similar process model as already depicted for tolerance.

Figure 2: A process model of disrespectful and respectful acceptance



Going into our little neighbourhood example again, let us imagine that Carl and Lisa have become friends by now, and have also formed their own little ‘gang’ which they refer to as the ShakeSnakes – because they both discovered that they were able to suck a

thick chocolate milkshake through five connected straws. One day they are walking along the streets when Pete, a kid from a close by village, comes up to them. He inquires if he can also become a member of the ShakeSnakes. He thinks that that would be super cool as he is going to stay with his aunt for the whole summer anyway and she lives just down the block from Lisa and Carl. Carl immediately agrees (yet, let us not investigate his reasons this time, but instead elaborate Lisa's potential decisions). For one, Lisa may think that people from that other village are somewhat weird and possibly even a little dumb (at least that is what her parents told her). Nevertheless, she might agree to accept Pete as a member of their group because Carl said so (disrespectful acceptance). Or, in another case, Lisa might simply not want to have Pete in the group and presents just any random reason for why he is rejected (disrespectful rejection).

If, however, Lisa thinks that, no matter what her parents told her, all people are very similar and deserve to be treated with respect, she might give Pete the proper consideration he deserves just like anybody else. Pete and she might come to an agreement that he has to pass the entry examination prior to becoming a member. In it they will assess if he can also suck a milkshake through five connected straws because, after all, this is the membership criterion. If he succeeds, she will (respectfully) accept him as part of the Snakes. However, should he fail at the performance, she will (respectfully) not allow him the membership of the group. Because Pete had the chance to have a say in the criterion upon which the issue of his membership is decided, we consider this behaviour as respectful (as opposed to disrespectful when the object has no say in the criteria that are being drawn upon for the decision process). Of course, here too, there is the additional option of not being able to reach a respectful conclusion, i.e., Lisa might want the milkshake straw test whereas Pete thinks this test is dumb and would prefer another one. Lisa then has to re-enter her decision process and decide again if she wants to confront the issue and if so, if she still wants to acknowledge Pete as an equal or rather choose the easy (disrespectful) way out and thus avoid the potential frustration of once more not being able to reach a conclusion.

Appraisal respect: The question of who one allows to influence oneself

Contrary to recognition or Kantian respect, appraisal respect has generally received fairly little attention in philosophy because it does not involve any morale or general sociological notion. Darwall (1977) states that 'appraisal respect' is about the excellence and commitment that subjects see in an object that warrant respect.

Yet, what is this sort of respect specifically about? It might seem at first sight as mere admiration for excellence, yet, we would argue that the eventually underlying issue of appraisal respect is 'influence'. We propose that someone's message of appraisal respect for an object is one's indication of the degree of influence one allows an object to exert on oneself. It can, for instance, show in adopting opinions or values, or in listening to the object's teachings. This notion thus appears somewhat comparable to the notion of 'status' which is often referred to in the psychological respect research (cf. De Cremer & Tyler, 2005b). Similarly, research designs which focus upon differences or evaluation components in the assessment of others (Branscombe, Spears, Ellemers, & Doosje, 2002; Ellemers, Doosje, & Spears, 2004; Sleebos, Ellemers, & de Gilder, 2006a, 2006b; Spears, Ellemers, & Doosje, 2005) seem to capture this sort of respect

rather than recognition respect (cf. Hudson, 1986, who refers to this kind of respect as 'evaluative respect'). Additionally however, we would argue that these research designs only assess appraisal respect to the degree that the participants feel that they actually have an influence on the deciding subject.

Further, we suggest that people usually only owe appraisal respect to people in domains that they can relate to. A painter might owe respect to Salvador Dali, or a race car driver to Michael Schumacher. It would seem somewhat odd if a scientist expresses respect for a sportsman for his/her achievements in sports. Yet, if there is an underlying dimension that the scientist can relate to, i.e., the achieved cognitive focus e.g., it would seem more natural to express this sort of respect as the scientist indicates that he/she could learn something from the sportsman in this domain.


Naturally, a focus upon excellence entails that appraisal respect is not owed to everyone, for it may or may not be merited (an important distinction in contrast to recognition respect). This often leads to confusion as sometimes people tend to demand appraisal respect due to a status position they have (i.e., a father from his daughter) when in fact true/respectful appraisal respect has to be earned among equals (i.e., status may be awarded afterwards but not before). Certain positions might have a higher chance of appraisal respect because people tend to think that objects in these positions are characterized by excellence. However, this is only a precondition. The respect itself, i.e., the right to exert influence, will nevertheless have to be earned (cf. Hollander, 1964, in which he describes that leaders need to earn personal 'credits' in order to be able to influence/lead followers).

The same as we have proposed for tolerance and acceptance before, we also argue that owing appraisal respect for someone is a more or less conscious process (- with 'admiration' maybe being its more subconscious counterpart). Once a subject is aware that there might be an object which warrants respect, it may decide to confront the issue or ignore it. As Figure 3 depicts, we also propose that the opposite of appraisal respect is in this case not disrespect (see above; we would only use 'disrespect' for the opposite of recognition respect). The opposite in our conception is reactance (cf. Brehm & Brehm, 1981) which means that one does not confer to the object's influence, but more or less actively attempts to block or avoid it (contrary to Sleebos et al., 2006a; Sleebos et al., 2006b, who call the opposite of appraisal respect 'disrespect').

Let us turn to our little neighbourhood to illustrate this conception again. Pete was accepted by the Shakes-Snakes. And so was later Rob, another kid from the block, who also showed the milkshake sucking qualities which they all agreed upon were needed to be accepted as a member of the group. One afternoon in that summer, the four of them start talking about school. Soon Rob, Carl and Lisa find out that, although they are in different classes, they all share the same physical education (PE) teacher, Mr. Cutter. Their attitudes towards him, however, seem quite different.

Rob says that he cannot respect Mr. Cutter because he is a PE teacher. Rob is convinced that anybody who could become anything else than a sports teacher would certainly do so. Consequently, anybody who is a sports teacher must be a total looser (disrespectful reactance). Although not knowing Mr. Cutter, Pete disagrees. He says that because Mr. Cutter is the teacher and older, all pupils should respect him and do as he says, no matter what one thinks personally of him or of his teaching. In his eyes, it is a matter of respect to listen and obey (disrespectful appraisal respect).

Figure 3: A process model of disrespectful and respectful appraisal respect



Carl and Lisa, however, react differently. They say that they actually respect Mr. Cutter as a person and not because he is a teacher. However, they both come to different conclusions as how to react towards him. Mr. Cutter once told both of them that excellent sports teachers have to know about the physiological dynamics of a body and that the kids should not just listen to anybody's advice only because they are muscular. Both kids could follow and agree with this reasoning. And indeed, Lisa finds that Mr. Cutter knows a lot about the physiological strains that are put on the body when doing sports. She thus happily listens to his teaching (respectful appraisal respect) as she hopes to learn how to master her sports. Carl however tells the other three kids that he has just recently been to a summer sports camp. In his eyes, Mr. Cutter has none of the qualities that the superb teachers have had at this camp. In fact, he thinks that Mr. Cutter actually knows a lot less than there is to know about the physiological side of sports and that the stuff he knows is comparatively superficial. Thus, in the coming school term, he wants to use the techniques he learned at the camp rather than follow Mr. Cutters' teaching (respectful reactance). Carl also reveals to the others that he has already spoken with

Mr. Cutter and, surprisingly to Carl, Mr. Cutter has agreed to Carl's plan and even asked him about the new stuff Carl had learned at his sport camp.

Later that day, shortly before bedtime, Carl tells his mother about the different attitudes he and his friends have concerning Mr. Cutter. She nods and tells him that back in her school days she also did not want to follow the teaching of her PE teacher. Unlike Carl however, she got into trouble when raising her opinion. Her teacher demanded to respect him due to his position while she did not want to listen to him because, in her eyes, he not only did not seem to know the rules of many sports, but also taught harmful stretching techniques. For a long time she was unsure how to settle the issue. Even repeated talks with her teacher did not help. Eventually, with a new school year, the sports teachers changed and she did not have to fight her frustration anymore.

Awareness: One cannot have an attitude on what is invisible to oneself

A final note needs to be made on an issue we repeatedly touched: awareness. All of the issue-driven attitudes are reactions towards an object with a focus on the specific issue that is at stake. The issues thus must be aware to the subject. If this is not the case a true 'reaction' and therefore an attitudinal response is not possible. Not even ignorance as a label would be applicable here because ignorance implies that one knows to a certain extent what one is ignoring. Things that seem self-evident to a subject, i.e., things that a subject takes for granted without ever questioning them, can therefore never evoke any of the above attitudinal responses – at least not unless the object or somebody else does something to question the status quo. This means that subjects cannot claim to be tolerant when they are not even aware that they could decide upon the legitimacy of an object's presence in their environment. People do not tolerate their neighbours simply because they live next door to them. They have to be 'visible', have to provoke people's perception to a certain degree (a deviance from the norm) before one could state "I am tolerating them". Also, we cannot speak of acceptance when questioning the object's group membership has never occurred to one. Being in a soccer team for years, one would usually not state that one accepts some of the other players as being part of the team. On the other hand, as soon as somebody new 'applies' for membership and wants to play with the team, it seems more plausible to state acceptance. And finally, also appraisal respect can only be said to be a response when the issue of the object's influence is something that the subject has reflected upon. It is thus unreasonable of parents to demand that their young children should respect them. These parents may be asking for obedience but can by no means establish respect at that stage.

Conclusions

Labels such as respect, acceptance and tolerance have a great appeal to the outside world – to the world of politicians and advisors in various settings. As scientists provide the basis by which a lot of people talk, they should be particularly cautious concerning the adequateness of the labels they choose for their phenomena. Even more so, not only for the outside world, but for the scientific world itself, it may actually be worthwhile to

follow a more or less shared definitional model and align the research with it – instead of following one's own definitions. Such an approach would foster an understanding among researchers because one would know which kinds of phenomena are exactly looked at and how or if eventual results are comparable. With the here presented framework, we think we were able to provide an important step into that direction. Arguably it is only a first step, but it points out valuable distinctions and conceptual overlaps. Just now as empirical respect research is picking up in the Social Sciences, especially in Psychology, we think the time was ripe for this paper.

We believe that the differentiation into the issue related attitudes of tolerance, acceptance, and appraisal respect, and the processing attitude of recognition respect provides a compelling notion which can explain some of the current confusion especially around the term 'respect'. We outlined how different issues might all be responded to respectfully or disrespectfully, depending upon if the object is acknowledged as an equal by the subject. In this respect, it has to be noted that it is hard for an observer to differentiate between the respectful and the disrespectful side of an issue driven attitude by merely looking at the results of a process. The difference occurs mainly in the process, i.e., in the interaction between subject and object. Researchers, who want to account for this more 'subtle' differentiation, should thus additionally focus upon the process element.

In fact, it should be highly worthwhile to explore if the four proposed different conditions on each issue are also responded to differently by the object, e.g., following a 2 by 2 design with *Results*: allowing vs. disallowing influence (reflecting appraisal respect) X *Process*: treatment as equal versus not (reflecting recognition respect) – (cf. Simon & Stürmer, 2003, although they did not specifically focus upon influence but solely upon a subject's positive versus negative evaluation of the object's work). That a subject's respectful treatment of an object may lead to an object's greater engagement for the subject appears to be quite natural. In our point of view however, it needs to be further investigated how this is interpreted by participants in light of different decision results on the specific issue. The same is true for the argumentation of disrespect. Here too, we would think that interaction effects with the outcomes on different issues are likely to occur.

While first conceptualizations on the potential motivational forces behind receiving (dis)respect are being developed (De Cremer & Mulder, in press; Simon, in press; Sleebos et al., 2006b; Sleebos, Ellemers, & De Gilder, in press), these forces may be very different concerning respect as a process (recognition respect) or as a result (appraisal respect). Indeed, we would argue that linking messages of respect to motivational forces have a great appeal and await confirmation, but should be undertaken under consideration that recognition respect might be confounded with the attitude of tolerance, acceptance, and appraisal respect.

Respect, be it as the vertical kind of appraisal respect or as the horizontal kind of recognition respect, is without doubt an interesting research topic in light of the fact that the exponentially increasing complexity on all levels of our society make systems (in business, education or politics) very difficult to govern. Respect might be the "social lubricant and glue" holding it all together. Our concern for respect is thus not driven by normative pathos, but it is raised because it might be the most sustainable way for our living together in light of the conflicts that arise from (complex) individual differences (cf. Honneth, 1996; Margalit, 1998).

Notes

This work is part of Niels van Quaquebeke's PhD dissertation under the supervision of Erich H. Witte. He likes to thank the German National Academic Foundation for providing a doctoral scholarship without which his studies would not have been possible.

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